Part Two: The New Orleans Experience With Extreme Storm Design Standards Is Instructive

Under-design – based on lax regulatory standards & cost considerations – can kill

Who will tell the people about this looming disastrous DEP decision?

In completing its draft report earlier this year, the Corps turned down a request by state and local officials to consider increasing protection to at least a 200-year level, or to a 500-year level of protection. It wasn’t justified, officials said.

“While the 200-year level of risk reduction alternative was competitive, its net [economic] benefits were lower than that of the 100-year level of risk reduction,” said Ricky Boyett, a Corps spokesperson. “Because of the lower net benefits, the 200-year level of risk reduction was not selected as the recommended plan.”

Such a cost-benefit analysis is part of a federal standard that compares reductions in property damages, emergency costs and the avoidance of economic losses from flooding against construction costs. (NoLA.com)

In yesterday’s post, in order to illustrate and draw a parallel between what is happening in NJ and what already occurred in New Orleans, I excerpted a key 2019 finding by the US Army Corps of Engineers from the Federal Register.

The astonishing USACOE finding was explained by Scientific American:

After a $14-Billion Upgrade, New Orleans’ Levees Are Sinking 

Sea-level rise and ground subsidence will render the flood barriers inadequate in just four years

The $14 billion network of levees and floodwalls that was built to protect greater New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina was a seemingly invincible bulwark against flooding.

But now, 11 months after the Army Corps of Engineers completed one of the largest public works projects in world history, the agency says the system will stop providing adequate protection in as little as four years because of rising sea levels and shrinking levees. […]

The agency’s projection that the system will “no longer provide [required] risk reduction as early as 2023” illustrates the rapidly changing conditions being experienced both globally as sea levels rise faster than expected and locally as erosion wipes out protective barrier islands and marshlands in southeastern Louisiana.

Let that sink in: a $14 billion levee upgrade – a project that was designed after an under-designed levee system failed and killed over 1,800 people – repeated the original under-design and as a result, was no longer adequately protective and effectively obsolete after just four years.

Deja vu: The levees that failed in New Orleans during hurricane Katrina were under-designed. They were designed to survive a Category 3 storm.

Katrina was a Category 4 storm and exceeded the levee design standards. The Army Corps initially admitted this: (Washington Post)

Johnston said the Corps intends to launch an investigation to make sure it is correct about that scenario. But he emphasized that Katrina was a Category 4 hurricane when it smashed into the Gulf Coast, whereas Congress authorized the Corps to protect New Orleans against a storm only up to Category 3. “The event exceeded the design,” Johnston said.

Several detailed forensic investigations later found the levee failure was caused by both under-design and poor construction.

The Corps’ Federal Register notice I cited was issued to announce an environmental impact statement on evaluating options on how to fix the problem caused by the post-Katrina under-design and upgrade the levees.

Here is the debate from post Katrina New Orleans that the Murphy DEP is trying to evade and the NJ press corps is not reporting – and it’s all about money versus death and destruction: (NoLa.com)

In completing its draft report earlier this year, the Corps turned down a request by state and local officials to consider increasing protection to at least a 200-year level, or to a 500-year level of protection. It wasn’t justified, officials said.

“While the 200-year level of risk reduction alternative was competitive, its net benefits were lower than that of the 100-year level of risk reduction,” said Ricky Boyett, a Corps spokesperson. “Because of the lower net benefits, the 200-year level of risk reduction was not selected as the recommended plan.”