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“Frankenstorm” Another Example of Global Warming Extreme Weather

October 26th, 2012 No comments

NJ’s Longstanding High Vulnerability to Major Storms Ignored  

Climate Change Adaptation Planing Neglected – Shore Poorly Prepared

beach and dunes severely eroded behind homes in Normandy Beach

“In New Jersey the coast is so heavily urbanized and developed you can’t expect people to simply agree to retreat – there’s too much invested in the shore,” said Martin Bierbaum, director of the Municipal Land Use Center at the College of New Jersey. ~~~  Coastal conundrum: New Jersey bill may protect economy but not environment

[Updates below]

Well Marty, people don’t necessarily need to agree to “retreat”.

Reality has a way of intruding – a major storm just might make relocation decisions for them.

Don’t say you weren’t warned.

We – and many others, e.g. see

have been writing about this for years now.

Here is Jim Hansen’s take:

The standard scientist answer is “you cannot blame a specific weather/climate event on global warming.” That answer, to the public, translates as “no”.  However, if the question were posed as “would these events have occurred if atmospheric carbon dioxide had remained at its pre-industrial level of 280 [parts per million] ppm?”, an appropriate answer in that case is “almost certainly not.” That answer, to the public, translates as “yes”, i.e., humans probably bear a responsibility for the extreme event.

In either case, the scientist usually goes on to say something about probabilities and how those are changing because of global warming. But the extended discussion, to much of the public, is chatter. The initial answer is all important. Although either answer can be defended as “correct”, we suggest that leading with the standard caveat “you cannot blame” is misleading and allows a misinterpretation about the danger of increasing extreme events.

We are warning the public and trying to get word out and some policy response to stuff like this: (DEP findings from the Section 309 Coastal Hazards Assessment)

Many parts of New Jersey’s densely populated coastal area are highly susceptible to the effects of the following coastal hazards: flooding, storm surge, episodic erosion, chronic erosion, sea level rise, and extra-tropical storms. Reconstruction of residential development and the conversion of single family dwellings into multi-unit dwellings continues in hazardous areas… the value of property at risk is increasing significantly. With anticipated accelerating sea level rise and increasing storm frequency and intensity, vulnerability to the risks of coastal hazards will not abate; it will only become more costly. […]

…in certain instances, structural engineering solutions will not be practical or economically feasible. In these cases future public and private development and redevelopment must be directed away from the hazardous areas. While some derogatorily refer to this option as “retreat,” from the perspective of sound planning based on the best available science, the concept actually involves “strategic adjustment.” Prudent planning requires that we expand upon the existing studies of the societal, economic, and environmental costs of possible mitigative actions while the greatest number of alternatives exist. 

So, as the storm bears down on the Mid-Atlantic shore and the news media enters the typical mindless feeding frenzy, we will try to get ahead of the news cycle to remind people of essential facts that again will be ignored by the media and public policymakers:

1) This storm is made more severe by global warming;

2) Storm frequencies, intensities, and damage will only increase over time;

3) We need to begin a radical emergency program to phase out fossil fuels and build a renewable energy infrastructure;

4) We need to adapt to severe climate/weather changes that are inevitable given past emissions and increasing atmospheric CO2 levels;

5) We are doing virtually nothing to address any of these major problems – examples:

[Update #1 –  we’ve previously severely criticized DEP for failure to plan and prepare for coastal storms and for delegating responsibility to local government, so not surprisingly DEP is getting “out in front” of the storm.

But they are focusing on and doing the wrong thing!

DEP says nothing about global warming, climate change adaptation, or limiting development in hazardous locations!

DEP is focused exclusively on rolling back DEP regulations! Here’s Commissioner Martin’s letter to Mayor’s:

Moving forward, DEP will soon be proposing regulatory changes to make it even easier for you to maintain streams and ease any flooding in your towns, including broader Permits By Rule, automatic authorizations if the Governor or FEMA declares a State of Emergency, new General Permits and simpler Individual Permits.

Update #2 – I thought folks might be interested in a good question from an excellent reporter, with my response:

Hi Bill,

Thanks so much for sending your post. I’m intrigued in particular by one thing, which I may write about next week:

1) This storm is made more severe by global warming;

Is that actually provable, or is it more a matter of extrapolation and conjecture, however logical? What’s the scientific basis? Do you have reports/data/etc?  Any scientists willing to discuss and confirm?

Thanks,

My reply:

The general theory is that global warming increases air, land and water surface temperatures, which increase atmospheric moisture content.

Warmer, wetter air results in more precipitation.

Warmer air and warmer ocean temperatures increase the energy of storms.

Storms therefore become more severe and frequent.

The “provability” is complex (technically, there are both plausible causal mechanisms (see above) and suggestive but not yet statistically reliable data), but that complexity is discussed by Jim Hansen:

Here is Jim Hansen’s take:

The standard scientist answer is “you cannot blame a specific weather/climate event on global warming.” That answer, to the public, translates as “no”.  However, if the question were posed as “would these events have occurred if atmospheric carbon dioxide had remained at its pre-industrial level of 280 [parts per million] ppm?”, an appropriate answer in that case is “almost certainly not.” That answer, to the public, translates as “yes”, i.e., humans probably bear a responsibility for the extreme event.

In either case, the scientist usually goes on to say something about probabilities and how those are changing because of global warming. But the extended discussion, to much of the public, is chatter. The initial answer is all important. Although either answer can be defended as “correct”, we suggest that leading with the standard caveat “you cannot blame” is misleading and allows a misinterpretation about the danger of increasing extreme events.

It is NOT conjecture or speculation, but it is science, statistics, and modeling.

In my post, (see: http://www.wolfenotes.com/2012/10/frankenstorm-another-example-of-global-warming-extreme-weather/

I linked to the following IPCC Report, but there are others:

IPCC Report Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation;

I am not familiar with scientists willing to go on the record on this.

Wolfe

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Declining EPA Funds Provided with Less Oversight to Failing NJ Clean Water Program

October 18th, 2012 No comments

Stonybrook Regional Sewage Authority wastewater treatment plant - over 30 year old technology in need of upgrades

EPA needs to step up its State oversight game

NJ Spotlight (“Where issues matter”) posted $78 million as their number of the day  today.

Because we’ve focused on infrastructure deficits –  climate change adaptation and water in particular – we thought we’d provide some context for the Number of the day.

NJ Spotlight reported:

New Jersey’s water infrastructure is in dire need of repair, and the federal Environmental Protection Agency has awarded the state $78 million, to be used in a revolving fund of low-interest loans to upgrade sewage plants and drinking water systems around the state.

The Clean Water State Revolving Fund received $57.7 million, which will be used to make improvements to wastewater treatment systems and control pollution from rain water runoff. The Drinking Water State Revolving Fund received $20 million to finance improvements to drinking water systems, particularly in small and disadvantaged communities.

The Sierra Club’s Jeff Tittel used the announcement to take aim at the Christie administration, charging them with backing off on stormwater and floodwater hazard regulations, as well as weakening protections in the Highlands and Pinelands, which are critical water-supply areas. Although Tittel welcomed the EPA investment, he said the state has a backlog of $25 billion in needed repairs. “This shows the EPA is more concerned about our water quality than the Christie administration.”

So what is the context here? What are the real policy issues? What are the facts? What is NJ’s infrastructure deficit? As indications of “commitment”,  what are the trends in EPA and State funding and regulatory policy?

I) NJ State Issues

First of all, as we reported in August of last year, NJ has a $28 billion water infrastructure deficit (drinking water and wastewater, exclusive of climate change adaptation, additional drinking water treatment for unregulated contaminants, and CSO).

Through the NJ Environmental Infrastructure Trust, the State of NJ provides more than 10 times more money for water infrastructure than US EPA.

[President Reagan, as part of his federal government dismantling effort, ended the federal funding commitment to water infrastructure when he abolished the original Clean Water Act’s EPA Construction Grants program and created a state funded program now known as State Revolving Funds.]

II) Federal Resources and Oversight Declining

As we reported back in February of this year, Obama Budget Cuts EPA and Clean Water Funding – reducing aid to State’s for water infrastructure.

Yes, we know those big bad Republicans in Washington are waging a “War on the Environment”, but this was President Obama’s budget and he initiated EPA cuts and he failed to fight for more funding for clean water – he didn’t even try.

Here is the recent EPA CWSRF data – (Source: USEPA – hit links below – FY ’09 omitted due to one time Recovery Act stimulus funds)

 Fiscal Year      EPA Region 2            NJ Share            National Total

FY 2010               $345                        $84                     $2.1 billion

FY 2011               $250                        $61                     $1.5

FY 2012               $239                        $58                     $1.5

In term of federal EPA oversight, back in the day, EPA funding used to come with strings attached – EPA would use federal funding to leverage state performance.

III) Bottom Line

So why is EPA awarding ANY money to NJ when the Christie Administration is rolling back water quality protections across the state?

These rollbacks are happening at a time when NJDEP is:

EPA needs to step up its oversight game and leverage federal resources, not reward NJ and the Christie administration for rollbacks and failure to perform.

EPA needs to threaten to withhold federal funding if NJ fails to meet its obligations under the Clean Water Act.

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Joint Legislative Environmental Committees To Hold Annual Shore Hearing on Monday

August 10th, 2012 1 comment

Serious Threats Remain Unaddressed

On Monday (August 13) the NJ Senate and Assembly Environment Committees hold their annual summer joint hearing focused on the shore (at 10 am in the  Lavallette First Aid Building, 1207 Bay Boulevard, Lavallette, NJ.)

The context for this year’s hearings is framed by another year of stinging jellyfish and growing threats of ecological collapse and harmful algae blooms in Barnegat Bay –

But far more serious problems lay buried beneath the radar.

Every now and then, a crisis provides a glimpse of the scope of those problems, which quickly fade in the 24 hour news cycle.

That is a radical departure from how things worked back in the day – like when rivers caught fire, politicians responded to public demands and passed the Clean Water Act.

For example, the recent Monmouth County water pipeline break was a perfect illustration of NJ’s multiple vulnerabilities to global warming – extreme weather, storm surge, sea level rise, coastal hazards, infrastructure, and climate change adaptation.

This week’s raw sewage discharge to the Hudson River from Tarrytown NY (my hometown) threatens the Iron Man competition – another high profile opportunity to focus on storm water management and combined see overflows“.

Over-fishing, habitat loss, and pollution kill fish - not fisheries management and protective catch limits.

And the Star Ledger  ran a page one story on the decline of NJ’s recreational fishing, boating, and marinas  – mistakenly attributing economic  woes to fisheries management and catch limits designed to protect over-fishing (at a time when the NJ fisheries management program is collapsing – and the Food and Drug Administration is threatening to shut down NJ’s commercial shellfishing market

But the joint Legislative Committees will not focus on any of this – instead, their hearing agenda is very narrowly crafted.

One scientist, Dr. Michael Kennish from Rutgers – will be allowed to testify on Barnegat Bay.

The remained of the day’s testimony will be on the “floatables” issue.

I objected to this narrow scope and have requested that legislators expand the hearing agenda – here is my note to the Committee Chairs, Senator Smith and Assemblywoman Spencer:

Dear Chairpersons:

Dr. Kennish is the leading expert on the science of the Bay and will make a wonderful witness – but he is not an expert on the DEP regulatory policies, standards and programs, including Clean Water Act provisions that apply.

Accordingly, the testimony is too narrowly crafted and the public should be provided opportunity to weigh in – at least with 5 minute statements if time is a consideration.

I also am disappointed by the narrow scope on related ecosystem issues.

In 2008 legislation, the Legislature created a “Coastal and Ocean Protection Council” and expanded DEP’s organic powers to include “ecosystem based management” (EBM) (see P.L. 2007, Chapter 288:

see also this ENS article:

Gov. Christie has zeroed the budget of that Council and done nothing too implement EBM in relevant DEP land use and water resource programs.

It seems that hearing agenda should be broadened to provide oversight of these issues, including major climate change related issues such as ocean acidification, sea level rise, shore vulnerability and coastal hazard assessment, climate change adaptation planning, fisheries management, and overall ecosystem health.

When state policymakers are silent on these critical issues, the public is left in the dark and vulnerable to manipulation and misinformation (see this weeks’s Star ledger page one story on fishery catch limits for one example).

We also released a major Report on the Delaware Bayshore that would be of relevance, see:

PROTECTING THE DELAWARE BAY ENVIRONMENT:

AN ANALYSIS OF EXISTING PROGRAMS
AND PROTECTIONS TO IDENTIFY OPPORTUNITIES FOR ECOSYSTEM BASED MANAGEMENT

The hearing’s narrow focus on floatables also ignores the far larger issue of “combined sewer overflows” (CSO), which are again in the news given the Hudson River discharge in NY that threatens this weekend’s IronMan competition.

I fear that largely cosmetic beach cleanup programs – and ineffective and partisan organizations – will use this narrow hearing agenda to promote the ineffective status quo and their own self interests (see: Of Monster Algae Blooms and Monstrous Lies)

Wolfe

Sunrise in Normandy Beach, NJ

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Lessons From Fukushima of Direct Relevance To US Regulators

July 6th, 2012 No comments

Japanese Find: “Existing regulations biased toward promotion of nuclear energy, and not to protecting public safety, health and welfare.”

NJ Gov. Christie’s Lax Regulatory Policy Mimics Japanese Failure

The Japanese Government just issued a scathing Report on the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

My guess is that any US media coverage will suggest that these problems are cultural and limited to Japan, where an unhealthy respect for authority is a cultural reality.

That “it can’t happen here where we have independent and vigorous regulatory oversight” view contrasts with how the NY Times investigative stories covered the nuclear industry in Japan.

In critical stories written shortly after the disaster, The Times exposed scandalous industry corruption, bribery, propaganda, myths, and improper industry influence that they would never write about in the US:

Over several decades, Japan’s nuclear establishment has devoted vast resources to persuade the Japanese public of the safety and necessity of nuclear power. Plant operators built lavish, fantasy-filled public relations buildings that became tourist attractions. Bureaucrats spun elaborate advertising campaigns through a multitude of organizations established solely to advertise the safety of nuclear plants. Politicians pushed through the adoption of government-mandated school textbooks with friendly views of nuclear power.

The result was the widespread adoption of the belief called the “safety myth” that Japan’s nuclear power plants were absolutely safe. …

Japan’s government has concentrated its propaganda and educational efforts on creating such national beliefs in the past, most notably during World War II. The push for nuclear power underpinned postwar Japan’s focus on economic growth and its dream of greater energy independence.

The Times’ reporting on Japan contrasts with what the media portray as strong US regulators and open and pro-public interest culture. While giving US industry and regulators a pass, The Times warned us all about  Japan’s secret and corrupt “culture of complicity“:

In 2000, Kei Sugaoka, a Japanese-American nuclear inspector who had done work for General Electric at Daiichi, told Japan’s main nuclear regulator about a cracked steam dryer that he believed was being concealed. If exposed, the revelations could have forced the operator, Tokyo Electric Power, to do what utilities least want to do: undertake costly repairs.

What happened next was an example, critics have since said, of the collusive ties that bind the nation’s nuclear power companies, regulators and politicians.

Despite a new law shielding whistle-blowers, the regulator, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, divulged Mr. Sugaoka’s identity to Tokyo Electric, effectively blackballing him from the industry.

So, I’ve again excerpted the primary conclusions from the Report on the Japanese experience as instructive for virtually every sphere of US nuclear, energy, environmental, and public health and safety regulatory programs across government agencies.

The historical policy and institutional problems outlined in the Japanese Report are greatly magnified right here in NJ by the Christie Administration’s policy, which is to slash “job killing red tape” regulations and reorient DEP’s culture and mission to be more “customer friendly” and to “promote economic development”.

These are exactly the policies that caused the Fukushima disaster. (and don’t forget that Oyster Creek, the oldest US nuke plant, is one of 23 Zombie US plants with the same flawed design as Fukushima.)

As the case of NJ nuclear whistleblower Dennis Zannoni makes clear (as well as my own experience), the Japanese findings are directly relevant to the US and the exact same set of systemic problems are present in US industry and regulatory agencies.

Reforming the regulators

The Commission has concluded that the safety of nuclear energy in Japan and the pub-lic cannot be assured unless the regulators go through an essential transformation process. The entire organization needs to be transformed, not as a formality but in a substantial way. Japan’s regulators need to shed the insular attitude of ignoring inter national safety standards and transform themselves into a globally trusted entity. (see Recommendation 5)

The regulators did not monitor or supervise nuclear safety. The lack of expertise resulted in “regulatory capture,” and the postponement of the implementation of relevant regulations. They avoided their direct responsibilities by letting operators apply regulations on a voluntary basis. Their independence from the political arena, the ministries promoting nuclear energy, and the operators was a mockery. They were incapable, and lacked the expertise and the commitment to assure the safety of nuclear power. Moreover, the orga- nization lacked transparency. Without the investigation by this Commission, operating independently of the government, many of the facts revealing the collusion between the regulators and other players might never have been revealed.

Reforming the operator

TEPCO did not fulfil its responsibilities as a private corporation, instead obeying and relying upon the government bureaucracy of METI, the government agency driving nuclear policy. At the same time, through the auspices of the FEPC, it manipulated the cozy relationship with the regulators to take the teeth out of regulations. (see Recom- mendation 4)

The risk management practices of TEPCO illustrate this. If the risk factors of tsunami are raised, for example, TEPCO would only look at the risk to their own operations, and whether it would result in a suspension of existing reactors or weaken their stance in potential lawsuits. They ignored the potential risk to the public health and welfare. (See Section 5)

Problems with TEPCO’s management style, based on the government taking final responsibility, became explicit during the accident. It prioritized the Kantei’s intent over that of the technical engineers at the site. TEPCO’s behavior was consistently unclear, and the misunderstanding over the “complete withdrawal” from the plant is a good example of the confusion that arose from their behavior. (See Section 3)

After the accident, TEPCO continued to avoid transparency in disclosing information. It limited disclosure to confirmed facts, and failed to disclose information that it felt was uncertain or inconvenient. Some examples of continuing disclosure issues include the delay in releasing electricity demand projections used as the basis for rolling blackouts, and the lack in up-to-date information on the core conditions at the plant.

Reforming laws and regulations

The Commission concludes that it is necessary to realign existing laws and regulations concerning nuclear energy. Mechanisms must be established to ensure that the latest technological findings from international sources are reflected in all existing laws and regulations. (see Recommendation 6)

Laws and regulations related to nuclear energy have only been revised as stopgap measures, based on actual accidents. They have not been seriously and comprehensively reviewed in line with the accident response and safeguarding measures of an international standard. As a result, predictable risks have not been addressed.

The existing regulations primarily are biased toward the promotion of a nuclear energy policy, and not to public safety, health and welfare. The unambiguous responsibility that operators should bear for a nuclear disaster was not specified. There was also no clear guidance about the responsibilities of the related parties in the case of an emergency. The defense-in- depth concept used in other countries has still not been fully considered.

Cosmetic solutions

Replacing people or changing the names of institutions will not solve the problems. Unless these root causes are resolved, preventive measures against future similar accidents will never be complete. (see Recommendations 4, 5 and 6)

The Commission believes the root causes of this accident cannot be resolved and that the people’s confidence cannot be recovered as long as this “manmade disaster” is seen as the result of error by a specific individual. The underlying issue is the social structure that results in “regulatory capture,” and the organizational, institutional, and legal framework that allows individuals to justify their own actions, hide them when inconvenient, and leave no records in order to avoid responsibility. Across the board, the Commission found igno- rance and arrogance unforgivable for anyone or any organization that deals with nuclear power. We found a disregard for global trends and a disregard for public safety. We found a habit of adherence to conditions based on conventional procedures and prior practices, with a priority on avoiding risk to the organization. We found an organization-driven mind- set that prioritized benefits to the organization at the expense of the public.

The “regulatory capture” of Japan’s nuclear industry

The fundamental causes of the accident, including the failure to carry out earthquake and tsunami measures and the lack of measures for dealing with a severe accident, can be also traced to the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC). This is an unregulated lobbying association of electric power companies, and thus also bears a share of the responsibility. …

The Commission’s examination of the way safety regulations are deliberated and amended reveals a cozy relationship between the operators, the regulators and academic scholars that can only be described as totally inappropriate. In essence, the regulators and the opera- tors prioritized the interests of their organizations over the public’s safety, and decided that Japanese nuclear power plant reactor operations “will not be stopped.”

Organizational issues concerning regulatory bodies

Prior to the accident, the regulatory bodies lacked an organizational culture that prioritized public safety over their own institutional wellbeing, and the correct mindset necessary for governance and oversight. The Commission concludes that the structural flaws in Japan’s nuclear administration must be identified through a critical investigation into the organi- zational structures, laws and regulations and personnel involved. We should identify the areas in need of improvement, recognize the lessons to be learned, and plot the fundamen- tal reforms necessary to ensure nuclear safety in the future.

Autonomy and transparency must be built into the new regulatory organizations to be created. They must have significant powers of oversight in order to properly monitor the operators of nuclear power plants. New personnel with highly professional expertise must be employed and trained. It is necessary to adopt drastic changes to achieve a properly functioning “open system.” The incestuous relationships that existed between regulators and business entities must not be allowed to develop again. To ensure that Japan’s safety and regulatory systems keep pace with evolving international standards, it is necessary to do away with the old attitudes that were complicit in the accident that occurred.

Laws and regulations governing nuclear power

The Commission has found that prior to the accident, revision and amendments of laws and regulations were only undertaken on a “patchwork” basis, in response to micro-con- cerns. The will to make large, significant changes in order to keep in step with the standards of the international community was utterly lacking.

At the time of the accident, the laws, regulations and infrastructure were based on the assumption that the scope and magnitude of possible natural disasters would not exceed precedent. There was a failure to take into account the prospect of unprecedented events such as the earthquake and tsunami on March 11, 2011, despite the fact that the possibility of such events was known.

Those in charge of the laws and regulations that governed the nuclear power indus- try in Japan had a dogmatic mindset that failed to keep pace with evolving international laws, standards and practices, and which disregarded pertinent technological advice and improvements from abroad. As a result, the laws and regulations governing Japan’s nuclear power industry at the time of the accident were outdated relative to those of other coun- tries and, in some cases, obsolete.

Prior to the accident, the primary purpose of the nuclear laws and regulations was the promotion of nuclear energy. The laws need to be rewritten with emphasis placed on pri- oritizing public safety, health and welfare. The roles, responsibilities and relationships of the operators, regulators and other involved entities need to be clearly delineated in the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness. The defense-in-depth needs to be formally enshrined in the regulations so that it will function properly when needed in the future.

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For NJ American Water, DEP, BPU, and Sustainable Jersey

July 6th, 2012 1 comment

Man Made, Foreseen, Preventable

“Rosebud”

Only driver left out was Heat, which increases water demand, evaporation, and PET

 

Inundation of Treatment Plants and Pump Stations/Damage to Drinking Water Treatment Infrastructure

Regional Level Action ~ Update 100‐year and 500‐year Floodplain Maps

Regardless of the quality of science available to determine the impacts of climate change on physical conditions in the Basin, specific inundation risks can only be effectively evaluated with updated shoreline topographical information.

Utility Level Action ~ Evaluate Placement of New Construction and Materials Resiliency

Drinking water utilities should evaluate the placement of new construction, monitoring equipment, and other infrastructure to avoid low‐lying areas or locations vulnerable to storms and other harsh weather  conditions. Ranges of potential flooding should be evaluated using the best available science. Adaptations can be refined as more information becomes available about specific impacts of sea level rise, potential increases in streamflow and other changes in the basin that pose a risk to drinking water utilities. Utilities should also evaluate and incorporate use of more resilient construction materials during day‐to‐day upgrades.

Increased Spills and Accidents/Power Outages and Customer Supply Issues

Regional Level Action ~ Support the XXXXXXXX Regional Early Warning System

The XXXXXXX Regional Early Warning System notifies drinking water utilities in the event of accidental contamination in certain areas of the XXXXXXX Basin. The system provides critical information to utilities so they can respond swiftly and appropriately to unexpected threats. Efforts to expand and improve this system must be supported to ensure the continued protection of drinking water supplies in the Basin.

Addresses: Increased Spills and Accidents
Involves: EPA,XXXX, state government, USCG, municipal government, Offices of Emergency Management

Utility Level Action ~ Evaluate Emergency Response Protocols

At the same time that regional emergency response protocols are being evaluated, water suppliers should conduct assessments of their individual utility emergency response protocols to identify vulnerabilities, fill gaps and develop needed contingency and customer communication plans. Revisiting emergency response plans can help protect utilities in the event of unexpected accidents or spills which may become even more prevalent with changing physical conditions in the Basin.

Addresses: Increased Spills and Accidents, Power Outages & Customer Supply Issues

Utility Level Action ~ Evaluate Customer Notification Needs and Protocols

Analyses show that XXXXXX and XXXXXX  are steadily increasing in the main stem XXXXXXX most likely because of increased development, road salts application, and inputs from wastewater and drinking water treatment. These parameters are not removed during conventional drinking water treatment and could pose problems for special needs customers such as dialysis patients and certain industries. Impacts of climate change on conditions in the Basin may exacerbate rising salinity. Water utilities should evaluate current salinity levels to determine if more frequent notification to special needs customers is required.

Rosebud: name that Report

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