The Bridge Did Not “Collapse” – It Was Knocked Down
Lack Of Ship And Harbor Safety Regulations And Strict Liability Standards Led To Crash
Renown public intellectual and Professor Noam Chomsky famously borrowed the phrase “engineering consent” from Walter Lippman, who stole it from Edward Bernays (“the father of public relations” – naming a new term and professional field to replace “propaganda”, which had been discredited by the Germans).
Speaking of engineering consent, the coverage of the Baltimore cargo ship crash presents a perfect case study of literally engineering consent on engineering solutions, a kind of negative variant of Naomi Klein’s “disaster capitalism” (in this case, the disaster is being used to cover up real solutions instead of providing a sham rationale for corporate “reforms” Klein writes about).
One would think that after a series of recent catastrophes – from multiple deadly plane crashes (Boeing), toxic train derailments, and oil and gas well blowouts that were linked to corporate malfeasance and lack of adequate regulatory oversight and strict regulatory standards – that the media would be skeptical of another one involving a cargo ship. Especially when the accident is fully visible on video tape.
One would be wrong.
The news headlines read that the bridge “collapsed”, when in fact it was knocked down.
The “collapse” metaphor attempts to shoehorn a shipping safety issue into an infrastructure investment issue.
As issue framing and propaganda slogan, this does huge things:
1) it blames government and allocates the costs of both the bridge rebuild and future prevention strategies onto the public taxpayer – to wit, Biden immediately pledged full federal funding for bridge replacement; and
2) it lets the entire global logistics system off the hook from multi-billon dollar costs of paying for the bridge replacement and new prevention measures, regulatory shipping and harbor safety mandates like tug boat escorts and dual redundant power and navigation systems on these huge cargo ships, and repeal of liability laws that provide huge subsidies and undermine safety and corporate accountability.
3) it gives the mainstream press permission to avoid real investigative journalism and controversial critical reporting to hold corporate power and government failure accountable.
For example, the Los Angeles – Long Beach California Harbor Safety Plan analyzed exactly the failure that happened in Baltimore (loss of power and navigation) and managed these risks with tug escorts, see:
“The Committee discussed the issue of tug escorts outside the federal breakwater during the 1994- 95 Plan review. Under the existing scheme, all tugs were meeting laden tankers just inside the breakwater entrances. Analysis of marine casualties for vessels operating in the LA/LB port area revealed that an average of 1 in 100 commercial vessels (1 per week) sustained some type of steering or propulsion failure during the inbound or outbound transit. The mechanical problem rate and the ever-decreasing amount of navigable water inside the breakwaters threaten safe transit of vessels through the “relatively” confined breakwater entrances. If a significant allision or collision causes a major oil or chemical release, the environmental and economic costs could be devastating.
The Tug Escort Subcommittee (TES) comprehensively assessed the risk associated with inbound laden tankers approaching and moving through LA/LB breakwater openings. The subcommittee found that the risk of steering failure or power loss justified implementing a tug escort scheme outside the breakwater. In order to develop an appropriate, practical and technically sound scheme, tug capabilities must match tank vessel size, speed and type of casualty. At the time, the San Francisco Glosten Study for Single Failures, (augmenting the less-relevant Dual Failure Study) was nearly complete, and TES felt the study would provide helpful technical insights. The Committee decided to review the Glosten Study results before finalizing a tug escort scheme outside the breakwater. In the interim, the Committees approved the following for the 1995 Harbor Safety Plan:
But instead of reporting on this Harbor Safety Plan (a formal regulatory document), The NY Times dug up some obscure 1980 claim that said the bridge could not survive a cargo ship head on crash ( high school physics – Force = Mass x Acceleration – makes that obvious. No bridge could survive that kind of head on crash).
By ignoring the LA/LB harbor Safety plan issues and reporting only the bridge design, engineering, and maintenance issues, The NY Times is engineering consent.
As an illustration, NPR just interviewed an academic structural engineer. The entire focus was on bridge engineering, possible engineering causes of collapse, and engineered devices to deflect ships away from crashing into bridges.
When the final question was perfunctorily asked: how can we prevent future vessel strikes?, the structural engineer proposed more engineering and said nothing about real ship and harbor safety plans and regulations and liability reforms and corporate accountability.
Three years from now when the NTSB issues its investigation Report, no one will be paying attention.
And the shipping industry and ports will continue on with the deadly status quo.